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HIGHLIGHTS 
o Laws that 11 mandate unrealistic goals or unreasonable methods for social 
regulation need to be revised. Such onerous regulation ranges from the 
•zero discharge• goal of the Clean Water Act to the •zero risk• provision 
of the Delaney Amendment of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The 
expiration of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act provides striking 
opportunities for incorporating desirable changes along these lines •••• 
The present time is ripe for embarking on a second phase of regulatory 
reform: the review and revision of the substantive laws governing the 
regulatory process. 11 
o 
11 The major obstacles to further substantial improvement in the regulatory 
process cannot be eliminated by executive action. Those obstacles are the 
rigid requirements and limitations in the basic statutes governing 
regulatory activities. After all, every regulation is issued pursuant to 
an act of Congress ... 
o 
11 The leadership of regulatory agencies ••• should understand that good 
policymaking means a careful balancing of a variety of important 
considerations -- such as clean air and high employment, healthier working 
conditions and greater productivity. Today, however, the most urgent need 
is to convince members of Congress to demonstrate such a sense of balance 
when they write the basic regula tory 1 aws. 11 
o 
11 The Clean Air Act is one of the most costly pieces of regula tory 
legislation in history. Its incremental costs -- expenditures beyond 
those that the private sector would voluntarily spend -- totaled $22 
billion back in 1979 •••• The annual cost for air pollution control, paid 
by the consumer in the form of higher prices for goods and services, 
amounted to $400 for a family of four in 1979. That figure is clearly 
higher today. 11 
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This is not the time either to rest on laurels or to become satisfied 
with the status quo. Rather, now is the right time to move to Phase II of the 
effort to reform the antiquated and needlessly burdensome regulatory apparatus 
of the federal government. 
Phase I has generally been accomplished. It consisted of establishing a 
comprehensive and fairly effective system for reviewing pending rulemaking. A 
major advance has been the incorporation of formal benefit-cost analysis in 
that review process. The Reagan Administration has estimated that its reviews 
to date have reduced the cost of compliance with federal regulation by $9-11 
billion in terms of capital outlays, and $6 billion a year on a continuing 
basis. 
Surely, additional improvements in administrative procedures are both 
desirable and possible. Benefit-cost analysis is a developing mechanism, 
especially as it is applied to regulation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
major obstacles to further substantial improvement in the regulatory process 
cannot be eliminated by executive action. Those obstacles are the rigid 
requirements and limitations in the basic statutes governing regulatory 
activities. After all, every regulation is issued pursuant to an act of 
Congress. 
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Recent experience shows that the fundamental shortcomings of government 
regulation result more from statutory than from administrative deficiencies. 
For example, the current leadership of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration has been trying to reduce the burdens of its rule-making. 
However, the courts have struck down specific changes on the grounds that the 
proposals were inconsistent with the statute under which the agency operates. 
The inherent desirability of OSHA's proposals is clear --to achieve health 
and safety objectives in a more cost-effective manner. As a result, revisions 
in the law now inhibiting such improvements should become a high priority. 
Many legislative enactments mandate unrealistic goals or unreasonable 
methods for social regulation and need to be revised. Such onerous regulation 
ranges from the 11 Zero discharge .. goal of the Clean Water Act to the 11 Zero 
risk 11 provision of the Delaney Amendment of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
The expiration of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act provides striking 
opportunities for incorporating desirable changes along these lines. A word 
of caution: recent experiences in the environmental area demonstrate the need 
for regulators to conform to existing statutes, whatever their shortcomings 
may be. But that experience also points up the need to update statutory 
requirements rather than introduce arbitrary administrative changes. 
I do not underestimate the importance of improving administrative review 
of existing as well as proposed regulations. Nevertheless, the present time 
is ripe for embarking on a second phase of regulatory reform: the review and 
revision of the substantive laws governing the regulatory process. Today, I 
want to focus on statutory problems in two key areas: 
1. The environment, specifically renewal of the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act. 
2. Occupational health and safety. 
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The selection of new appointees to regulatory agencies is a related and 
vitally important function. The experiences of recent years in several 
administrations demonstrate the need to select people who take a balanced 
approach to the benefits and burdens of regulation. Appointing uncritical 
enthusiasts for expansion of government regulation inevitably produces a 
regulatory regime characterized by excessive burdens and cavalier disregard of 
economic impacts. Similarly, regulators who lack a basic sympathy toward the 
programs they administer -- or who, through lack of sensitivity, project such 
a negative image -- are also counterproductive. 
Regulatory activities that are deemed worthy of continuation should be 
managed by people who are both sympathetic to the important social objectives 
to be achieved and equally concerned with minimizing the burdens they impose 
on individual citizens as taxpayers and consumers. The leadership of 
regulatory agencies -- as well as of other governmental activities should 
understand that good policymaking means a careful balancing of a variety of 
important considerations -- such as clean air and high employment, 
healthier working conditions and greater productivity. Today, however, 
the most urgent need is to convince members of Congress to demonstrate such a 
sense of balance when they write the basic regulatory laws. 
Let me turn to the serious and difficult question of amending the 
environmental and safety laws. 
Updating the Environmental Statutes 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the urgent and 
strident concern for improved environmental quality that characterized the 
past decade unfortunately meant that important economic factors got lost in 
the rush to regulate. But is equally important not to shift to the other 
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extreme. Thus, in considering changes in the Clean Air Act and the Clean 
Water Act, the issue is not whether environmental controls are needed. That 
issue was settled years ago. The pertinent question now is how to improve the 
effectiveness of the billions of dollars spent each year on pollution control. 
Unfortunately, that important goal has been obscured by the plethora of 
disturbing reports on administrative shortcomings in EPA. In retrospect, many 
of those administrative problems arose from misguided attempts to work around 
extremely onerous statutory requirements. The undramatic but serious business 
of environmental cleanup requires attention to be focused on those 
shortcomings in existing law. 
Revising the Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act is one of the most costly pieces of regulatory 
legislation in history. Its incremental costs -- expenditures beyond those 
that the private sector would voluntarily spend --totaled $22 billion back in 
1979, the last time that the government attempted to cost out these 
regulations. According to the Council on Environmental Quality, expenditures 
of nearly $300 billion will be needed to meet Clean Air Act requirements 
during the period 1979 to 1988 (measured in 1979 dollars). The annual cost 
for air pollution control, paid by the consumer in the form of higher prices 
for goods and services, amounted to $400 for a family of four in 1979. That 
figure is clearly higher today. 
Clean air regulation generates many other costs to the economy. These 
include increased construction costs due to delays in granting permits, lags 
in initiating new projects due to potential environmental challenges, and 
reduced progress in reaching the goal of increasing U.S. energy independence. 
It is ironic to note that lags in productivity-enhancing investment caused by 
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clean air regulations interfere with the achievement of the goals of the Clean 
A i r Act i t s e 1 f • 
For example, in areas where air quality is better than the national 
standards (designated as Prevention of Significant Deterioration areas), 
delays of two or three years in obtaining building permits are commonplace. 
That results in greatly increased construction costs. It now takes eight to 
ten years to construct a 1,000-megawatt coal-fired power plant, whereas it 
took only four to five years to construct such a facility a decade ago. More 
than half the $1 billion cost of such an installation is due to requirements 
for scrubbers and the interest and related expenses incurred during the 
four- to five-year period of extra delay. 
But, in addition, these delays postpone the time that aging, less 
efficient, and more polluting factories can be replaced with more productive 
and less polluting new facilities. In this way, some of the provisions of the 
Clean Air Act are self-defeating. Ironically and unintentionally, they retard 
efforts to reduce air pollution. 
Let me suggest seven changes in the Clean Air Act that would produce a 
salutary effect on the economy without sacrificing air quality objectives 
crucial to public health: 
(1) EPA should be required to establish standards that will 
protect the public against 11 unreasonable risk of adverse 
health effects... In determining .. unreasonable risk, .. the 
EPA administrator should be required to consider the nature 
and extent of the risk, the attainability of the standard, 
economic values, and other important public interests. 
(2) Secondary (non-health-related) air standards should be 
set by individual states. 
(3) 11 Prevention of Significant Deterioration increments .. for 
allowable air quality degradation should apply only to national 
park areas. 
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(4) All mandated control technologies should follow the 
procedures for 11 best available control technology ... 
(5) States should be allowed to substitute emission fees for current 
offset procedures in nonattainment areas. In general, market 
incentives should be substituted for command and control 
regulation when possible. The need for statutory change is 
underscored by the recent Court ruling that sensible innovations 
such as the 11 bubble concept 11 -- treating pollutants for a whole 
plant rather than by individual smokestacks -- are 
11 impermissible 11 under current law. 
(6) New emission sources and modified sources should not be required 
to install additional control equipment -- absent newly 
discovered health threats --within ten years of installation of 
approved equipment to control a particular pollutant. 
(7) Research on the causes of 11acid rain 11 should be accelerated. No 
inflexible legislative requirements should be set without 
sufficient scientific evidence and cost/benefit analysis. 
America's resources are vast but not unlimited. We can indeed afford to 
protect our citizens from unreasonable exposure to unhealthful air pollutants. 
But it is imperative that the laws governing how we accomplish this important 
task be designed to encourage the most effective and least disruptive means of 
achieving these important environmental objectives. Reauthorization of the 
Clean Air Act gives Congress the opportunity to do just that. 
Revising the Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act, like its costly cousin the Clean Air Act, was 
scheduled to be reauthorized or revised by October 1, 1981. But it remains 
unchanged to date. The Act appears to have arrested the degradation of water 
quality. Yet the evidence tha't it has actually improved water quality is 
largely anecdotal. There is no doubt, however, that the Act has been costly. 
According to the latest published figures from the Council on Environmental 
Quality, incremental costs for industries and municipalities totaled over $12 
billion in 1979 -- $6 billion in public spending (financed by taxpayers) and 
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more than $6 billion in private expenditures (paid by consumers). The CEQ 
also estimated that the cumulative incremental costs for the period 1979-1988 
would total nearly $170 billion. 
The two primary goals of the Clean Water Act are 1) to eliminate the 
discharge of pollutants by 1985, and 2) to make all lakes and streams fishable 
and swimmable by July 1, 1983. Both goals are widely acknowledged to be 
unattainable. Since technically these are goals and not legal requirements, 
supporters of the current law see no need to change them. Nonetheless, 
unrealistic goals do have consequences. For instance, recent efforts by the 
Environmental Protection Agency to allow more state control over designation 
of the use of a particular stream has been challenged on the grounds that it 
is an abandonment of the 11 fishable/swimmable 11 goal. 
Three primary Clean Water Act requirements will create much confusion if 
they are not modified soon. First of all, the July 1, 1984, deadline for 
installation of Best Available Technology (BAT) for toxic pollutants and Best 
Conventional Technology for conventional pollutants cannot be met. According 
to the Act, EPA must specify BAT for 129 toxic substances used in 34 different 
industries. Thus far the agency has been able to promulgate regulations for 
only 3 industries inorganic chemicals, timber processing, and iron and 
steel. Furthermore, rigidly proceding to new, more costly standards is not 
necessary in many cases. Current cleanup methods for conventional pollutants 
have proved to be effective for removing a high percentage of heavy metals and 
other taxies. In light of these facts, the deadlines should be extended to 
July 1, 1988, as EPA has urged. 
The 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act also require 11 pretreatment 11 of 
toxic substances that are discharged by industry into publicly owned treatment 
8 
works. National categorical standards are required for 129 taxies and 34 
industries. But only requirements for electroplaters and timber products have 
been set to date. Industry, the EPA, and the House Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Review all concur that this approach should be abandoned in favor of local 
control over usage of sewage facilities on the basis of the current permitting 
system. 
The third major Clean Water Act provision needing immediate revision is 
the permitting system itself, the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System. Between 1972 and 1976, EPA and the states issued approximately 65,000 
11 first round, .. five-year permits based on Best Practicable Technology. The 
second round of permits were to be based upon the more stringent Best 
Available Technology (BAT) requirements. Thus far 30,400 permits have 
expired. Over the next three years, the remainder of first round permits will 
expire. With 5-year permits, the backlog can never be reduced at current 
permit issuing levels. Before the permitting authority can complete permit 
issuance of existing expired permits, the reissued 5-year permits will begin 
expiring once again. The EPA, industry, and the House Oversight Subcommittee 
all have recommended that permits should have a longer life -- eight to ten 
years. 
Updating The Job Health and Safety Statutes 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 created one of the most 
controversial of all federal agencies. Many critics have contended that OSHA 
has pursued the wrong goal -- focusing on the details of on-the-job safety 
rather than improving occupational health. In addition, the agency has been 
criticized for using the wrong tools in applying broad, standards-based 
regulations rather than using a flexible, incentives approach. 
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The most damning criticism of OSHA is that, although it imposes large 
costs on the private sector, it has accomplished little in the way of 
improving the conditions in which Americans work. Just look at the data on 
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities since 1972, the first year in which the 
agency was operational. The number of job-related illnesses and injuries per 
worker has been rising since 1972, as has the number of lost workdays per 
worker. The annual number of workplace fatalities has fluctuated without any 
visible trend for better or worse. 
After a shaky start, dominated by the promulgation of a host of silly and 
nitpicking regulations, OSHA began to streamline its regulations. This change 
has reduced the day-to-day complaints on the part of those regulated. Yet the 
fundamental statutory shortcomings remain. If anything, they are now more 
visible. As I noted earlier, the courts have struck down several important 
administrative efforts to reduce the burden of OSHA regulation because of 
statutory requirements. 
The lesson to be learned is that the vagueness of the OSHA statute is now 
the problem which must be addressed. Clearly, the underlying statute needs to 
be made more explicit. The revision should embody three modifications: 
(1) Change the basic role of OSHA from that of a legal adversary, 
making inspections and insisting on compliance with complex 
detailed standards, to a safety leader. Such an organization 
should investigate new techniques in safety engineering, publish 
and disseminate information, and assist the safety departments 
of individual firms in solving their specific problems. 
(2) Make explicit what is 11 reasonable 11 and 11 feasible 11 by allowing 
decisions to be made on the basis of a comparison of the 
benefits to workers to the compliance costs. Such analyses 
should include the explicit costs of safety equipment, and the 
implicit but substantial costs of the paperwork burdens of 
technical compliance. 
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(3) Shift the basic orientation of enforcement from punishing 
employers if workers do not comply to a shared system of 
incentives, encouraging cooperation and flexibility in 
responding to specific job-safety problems. 
From the viewpoint of legislators, the courts, and OSHA itself, these 
changes will allow a much more effective pursuit of the ultimate goal: 
improving the safety and health conditions in which American men and women 
work. 
I hope that the Mine Health and Safety Administration can benefit from 
the positive experiences of OSHA. For example, the 1977 Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Act requires mandatory enforcement inspections at all mines, 
regardless of their safety record. The 1977 act also severely restricts 
consultative nonenforcement visits at operating mines. The result is similar 
to OSHA•s experience that inspectors are generally viewed as policemen rather 
than safety professionals who can provide constructive help. 
Surely, mine safety would be enhanced and the loss of productivity 
reduced if MSHA would focus its enforcement efforts on serious hazards. 
Balancing enforcement with cooperative programs should aim not on enhancing 
statistics on inspections and sanctions, but on reducing and better yet 
preventing mine injuries and illnesses. 
Conclusion 
Just a few words of conclusion: The task of updating regulatory statutes 
is not easy. The types of changes that should be made depend on the nature of 
existing regulation, the specific regulatory mechanisms currently in use, and 
the shortcomings, if any, in the unregulated private economy. I do not 
advocate a simple or uniform response. Each regulatory law should be examined 
individually and carefully. 
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In the area of economic regulation -- notably energy and surface 
transportation -- greater reliance on competition and market forces is 
extremely desirable. For social regulation, we must recognize that the status 
quo in federal regulation is so often dominated by those types of 
interventions that generate more costs than benefits. Thus, regulatory 
reform -- by revising or eliminating regulations that generate more costs than 
benefits -- could result in cumulative advantages to taxpayers anrl consumers 
alike, and simultaneously help to restore America's productivity and 
competitiveness at home and abroad. 
